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Articles

A BETTER PATH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
TORT LAW
John M. Greabe*
Author's Note: The Supreme Court issued an opinion in Pearson
v. Callahan -a case I discuss in this paper- just as the paper was about
to go to press. In Pearson, a unanimous Court reached the result for
which I argue on narrower grounds than I propose. The Pearson decision does not affect the arguments I present in the paper.

There is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of constitutional tort law. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the federal statute under which most constitutional
tort claims are brought, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1 is not substantive; it
merely channels positive law rights created elsewhere, primarily
in the Constitution. 2 But on the other hand, the doctrinal regime
the Court has created under section 1983 (as well as the parallel
regime authorized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotici) avoids difficult governmental im* Associate Professor of Law. Vermont Law School. The author would like to
thank Seth Aframe. Lowell Brickman. Alan Chen. Erin Curley. Bruce Duthu. Jackie
Gardina. Judge Jeffrey Howard. Heidi Kitrosser. Gil Kujovich. Ed Kulschinsky. Ken
Sansone. Ryan Searle. Judge Norman Stahl. and Ernie Young for their excellent comments and suggestions.
1. In pertinent part. 42 U .S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who. under color of any statute. ordinance. regulation. custom. or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia. subjects. or causes
to be subjected. any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights. privileges. or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. suit in equity. or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2000).
2. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). To simplify. I will limit my references to section 1983
throughout this paper. But readers should construe my arguments also to apply to the
Supreme Court's parallel Bivens jurisprudence.
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munity issues by requiring that nearly all claims for damages
formally be brought against personal defendants in their individual capacities.~ The fact that nearly all damages claims under section 1983 are brought as individual-capacity actions cannot be
squared with characterizing section 1983 as non-substantive.
Outside of the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery or involuntary servitude, the Constitution does not impose limits on
individuals as individuals-i.e. as private jural persons separate
and distinct f~om the government whose power they are said to
have abused.' Thus, personal defendants cannot "violate" the
Constitution in their individual capacities, and a section 1983
plaintiffs right to claim against a personal defendant in an individual capacity cannot arise directly from the Constitution. And
this leaves only one other potential source of this important substantive right: section 1983.
This paper seeks to explain how recognizing the substance
of section 1983 insofar as it authorizes individual-capacity claims
could pave the way for a clarifying reform of the quagmire that is
constitutional tort doctrine." Part I starts with an elaboration of
why section 1983 is substantive and an explanation of why an individual-capacity claim, while containing an imbedded constitutional issue, is not itself truly "constitutional. " 7 Part I then discusses some implications of these observations for a problem
that the Supreme Court is poised to revisit when it decides Pearson v. Callahan later this term: the wisdom and legality of the
order-of-decisionmaking rule prescribed in Saucier v. Katz.s The
Saucier rule directs that, in individual-capacity actions in which
the defendant asserts a qualified immunity from damages liability because the challenged conduct was not obviously unlawful,"
courts should enable the ongoing development of constitutional
law by deciding whether the defendant's conduct caused a constitutional deprivation before proceeding to decide whether the
defendant is entitled to immunity. 10

4. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
6. For why constitutional tort doctrine is a quagmire. see infra note 49 & notes 5888 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
8. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). receded by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). In
Pearson v. Callahan. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). the Supreme Court issued an order granting a
writ of certiorari and directing the parties to brief "[w]hether the Court's decision in
[Saucier] should be overruled." 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008).
9. See infra note 30.
10. 533 U.S. at 201.
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Part I concludes with an argument that the Saucier rule,
which was imposed because of concerns about the ·'freezing" of
constitutional law/' should be relaxed and modified to take account of the fact that binding constitutional rulings should not be
made in statutory claims against individuals as individualsclaims to which the government is not formally even a party.'' In
those cases where the law-development concerns underlying
Saucier lead a court to conclude that it should address the constitutional issue that is imbedded within an individual-capacity
claim, the government should first be invited to intervene and to
brief its position on the constitutionality of the conduct that the
lawsuit has put into issue. L'
Part II turns to a larger doctrinal consequence of the erroneous assumption that section 1983 is non-substantive: the
emergence over the past 40 years of the non-textual affirmative
immunity defenses that the Supreme Court has read into the
statute and made available to individual-capacity defendants.'~
Part II argues that, once one appreciates that section 1983 is substantive insofar as it authorizes individual-capacity claims, the
door opens to important questions that the Court has not asked:
Is there really any reason to read a conflict of laws into individual-capacity claims under section 1983. as the Court has done in
creating these affirmative immunity defenses? More specifically.
11. See id.: see also infra note 35 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. This argument modifies my prior
position. which was that courts should be sensitive to law-freezing concerns and address
the imbedded constitutional issue unless case-specific reasons counsel against doing so.
See also John M. Greabe. Mirabile Dictum': The Case for ··unnecessary·· Conslillllional
Rulings in Ch·il Rigllls Damages ACiions. 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403. 426-37 (1999).
My prior position took as a given the foundational proposition that this paper criticizes:
that the threshold question in an individual-capacity damages claim is itself --constitutional.""
By requiring that courts always address the constitutional issue that is imbedded
within the threshold statutory question presented in an individual-capacity claim. Saucier
went beyond the ··presumptive(]"" approach for which I argued and adopted an unduly
inflexible approach. See id. at 437 (describing situations where bypassing the constitutional issue is .. the wiser jurisprudential course .. ). For this additional reason. I would like
to see the Court relax the Saucier mandate when it decides Pearson v. Callahan. And vet.
the Court should continue to emphasize the costs of law-freezing and chart a cours~ by
which courts entertaining individual-capacity claims in which it is important to settle the
law may solicit government intervention and then legitimately address the imbedded
constitutional issue. Below. I argue that the Court might look to and borrow from the
procedures specified in FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1 and FED. R. APP. P. 44. which mandate notice
to the government and an opportunity to intervene in cases where privatt! parties challenge the constitutionality of statutes and the government is not a named party. See infra
note 47 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 77-7H and accompanying text.
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is there really any reason to treat the substantive entitlements to
sue individuals that section 1983 creates as coextensive with true
constitutional rights but subject to being trumped by affirmative
immunity defenses, drawn from the common law. that the statute does not authorize? And is there anything worthwhile accomplished by this giving-with-the-one-hand-while-taking-withthe-other construction of the statute, which often results in a section 1983 plaintiff being told that a remedy is being withheld
even though there has been a rights-violation?
Part II contends that the answer to each question is no.
Constitutional tort litigation would be far better off if the Supreme Court reinterpreted section 1983 to avoid this conflict between statutory text and common law (which it has inexplicably
resolved in favor of the common-law rule!), eliminated all affirmative immunity defenses. and instead construed the entitlements to sue individuals that section 1983 authorizes as narrower
than the true constitutional rights that limit government enti1
ties. ' Such a reading, which is rooted in existing Court precedent.1" would do far less violence to the text of the statute than
17
that inflicted by current doctrine. Moreover, narrowing the substantive reach of the statute could help to promote the early
resolution of groundless damages claims at the pleading stage,
minimize costly disagreements over issues peripheral to liability,
and preserve the substantive rights and procedural protections
that parties to section 1983 actions presently enjoy- all within a
litigation framework that is built on ground rules familiar to
judges and practitioners, and therefore less likely to cause un1
necessary confusion or to invite lawless judicial tinkering. H Finally, the proposed reform would help to clarify that, whatever
else might be said of it, the limited damages-liability regime authorized by section 1983 involves no disregard of Chief Justice
Marshall's promise of a remedy for every invasion of a constitu2
tional right, 1y as many commentators have charged. ° For it would
drive home the point that an individual-capacity damages action

15. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 58-78 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 105-114 and accompanying text.
19. Marburv v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137. 163 (1803) ("The government of
the United State~ has been emphatically termed a government of laws. and not of men. It
will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation. if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of·a vested legal right.").
20. See Greabe. supra note 13. at 404-05 & n.11 (collecting a representative sampling of such criticisms).
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is merely a unique statutory tort claim that Congress has authorized against some personal defendants involved in constitutional
violations, and that it is cumulative of any direct remedy the
plaintiff might have against the government agency which actu21
ally committed the constitutional violation.
I. THE SUBSTANCE OF SECTION 1983 AND THE
FALSE PREMISE OF SAUCIER

The Supreme Court appears to have taken the non22
substantive nature of section 1983 as a given. But at the same
time, the Court has avoided the potentially difficult immunity
problems that would be raised in suits for damages brought directly against government entities by requiring that nearly all
claims for damages under section 1983 be filed as individualcapacity claims against the personal defendants who have acted
23
under color of law during the incident underlying the lawsuit.
21. For an interesting discussion of what remedies might be constitutionally required for invasions of constitutional rights. see John C. Jeffries. Jr.. The Right-Remedy
Gap in Constillltional Law. 109 YALE L.J. 87. 88-89 (1999) (suggesting. among other
things. that "[T]he only constitutionally mandatory. as distinct from normatively desirable. remedial scheme is the right of a target of government prosecution or enforcement
to defend against that action on the ground that it violates the superior law of the Constitution.").
22. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe. 536 U.S. 273. 279 (2002) (asserting without elaboration that § 1983 merely creates remedies for federal rights created elsewhere): Albright v.
Oliver. 510 U.S. 266.271 (1994) (similar): City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle. 471 U.S. 808.
816 (1985) (similar) (Rehnquist. 1.. plurality opinion): Baker v. McCollan. 443 U.S. 137.
144 n.3 (1979) (similar): Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org .. 441 U.S. 600. 017
(1979) (''[O]ne cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of§ 1983' -for§ 1983 by itself
does not protect anyone against anything."). So too with Bivens. See also Wilkie v. Robbins. 127 S. Ct. 2588. 2597 (2007) (describing Bivens as a mechanism for fashioning a
"damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation"): Correctional Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko. 534 U.S. 61. 66-70 (2001) (emphasizing the limited remedial purpose of the
Bivens doctrine).
23. Civil rights damages claims almost always target individuals because the Supreme Court has held that states and their subdivisions are not "persons" subject to suit
under section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police. 491 U.S. 58. 64 (1989). and
that sovereign immunity shields the federal government from damages claims under the
Bivens doctrine. see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer. 510 U.S. 471.485 (1994). Municipalities are potentially subject to constitutional damages liability. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of City of New York. 436 U.S. 658. 690 (1978) (overruling Monroe v.
Pape. 365 U.S. 167. 187-91 (1961 ). and holding that municipalities are "persons" subject
to suit under § 1983). but they are not liable for the conduct of municipal actors under a
theory of respondeat superior. id. at 691. Rather. municipalities are only subject to section 1983 liability when the plaintiffs injuries are caused by municipal "policy or custom ... id. at 694-95. a concept that has been narrowly defined and is quite difficult to
prove. see. e.g.. Richard H. Fallon. Jr .. The "Conservative .. Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions. 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429. 463 (2002); Jeffries. supra note 21. at 93.
As Dean Jeffries has observed. the predominance of "individual capacity" claims in
constitutional damages actions. and the concomitant freedom from damages liability for-
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~y proceedi~_p down this path, the Court has created a doctrinal
mcoherence.The problem is this: If we are to take seriously the proposition that, outside of rare situations involving the Thirteenth
Amendment, only the government (acting, necessarily, through
living agents) can violate the Constitution, 2' the reality of individual-capacity damages claims is fundamentally at odds with
treating section 1983 as merely remedial. Individuals as individuals lack the legal capacity to violate the Constitution. Only a
government entity, or an individual serving as an agent of the
government and therefore acting in a public capacity because the
individual (1) is employed by the government and has acted
within the scope of his employment, (2) has exercised a "public
function," or (3) has received tacit governmental ratification of
the conduct in circumstances sufficient to warrant application of
the Supreme Court's state-action "entanglement'' cases, has the
inherent capacity to infringe constitutional rights. 26 Thus, insofar

mally enjoyed by government entities other than municipalities. have less practical significance than one might think. It is common for the government to insure against the
costs of defending individual-capacity claims (the defense is typically provided by insurance defense lawyers and not publicly employed lawyers) and to indemnify their employees against individual-capacity judgments. See Jeffries. supra note 21. at 92-93; see also
John C. Jeffries. Jr.. In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983. 84 VA. L.
REV. 47.49-50 (1998).
24. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
25. See LACRENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN COI"STITUTIONAL LAW.§ 18-1. at 1688
(2d ed. 1988) ("Nearly all of the Constitution's self-executing. and therefore judicially
enforceable. guarantees of individual rights shield individuals only from government action."): id. at 1688 n.l (recognizing that only "[t]he thirteenth amendment's prohibitions
of slavery encompass both governmental and private action") (citing The Civil Rights
Cases. 109 U.S. 3. 20 (1883)): see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co .. Inc .. 500 U.S.
614. 619 (1991): National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian. 488 U.S. 179. 191
(1988): Flagg Bros .. Inc .. v. Brooks. 436 U.S. 149. 156 (1978): The Civil Rights Cases. 109
U.S. at 13-14.
26. See TRIBE. supra note 25. at 1688-89. In the excellent casebook from which I
teach. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky calls conduct falling within these "public function" and
"'entanglement" categories "'exceptions to the state action doctrine." ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY. CO:--ISTITUTIONAL LAW 472 (2d ed. 2005). He also describes these categories as "'situations where private conduct must comply with the Constitution." /d. I find
these characterizations of the state-action cases. aptly described by one prominent commentator as "a conceptual disaster area:· Charles L. Black. Jr .. Foreword: "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14. 81 HARV. L. REV. 69. 95 (1967). to
confuse more than they clarify. The phrase "'exceptions to the state action doctrine" can
be read to suggest that the Constitution applies even though there is no state action. and
the term "'private .. invites the reader to regard the conduct in question as not attributable
to the government. But the state-action cases are better read to hold precisely the opposite: they involve instances in which conduct that might initially be thought to fall beyond
the Constitution's regulatory compass because it was undertaken by persons who are not
government employees is nonetheless treated as state action auributable to the government.
See CHEMERII\;SKY. supra. at 474-518: see also TRIBE. supra note 25. at 1688-91. For
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as section 1983 creates individual-capacity lawsuits, the statute is
necessarily substantive. By authorizing causes of action against
individual persons in their capacities as private jural entities separate and apart from their public capacities as agents through
whom the government acts, section 1983 creates substantive entitlements, and imposes on individual-capacity defendants substantive duties, that otherwise would not exist. A natural person
adjudged individually liable under section 1983 for what the Su27
preme Court frequently terms a "constitutional violation" has
not, in fact, personally "violated" the Constitution. Individualcapacity liability arises only by virtue of the fact that the personal defendant has violated a federal statute-one whose substantive reach is defined by reference to the Constitution but
which itself creates substantive entitlements and duties insofar as
it authorizes suits against individuals as individuals for their roles
in constitutional violations.
Why does it matter that we resist the tendency to think that
our constitutional "rights" are enforceable (either defensively, as
in a motion to suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence in a
criminal case, or offensively, as in a section 1983 action) against
not only an overreaching government but also against the human
agents through whom the government acts in their capacities as
private citizens? Why does it matter that we recognize the substantive nature of an individual-capacity claim under section
1983? It matters because, if one accepts that section 1983 creates
substantive entitlements that otherwise would not exist, and that
it does not merely specify remedies for substantive rights created
in the Constitution, there is no longer any reason to presume
that the substantive entitlements to sue individuals that section
1983 creates are the same as, or coextensive with, true constitutional rights. And this opens the door to considering whether
these statutory entitlements might be regarded as narrower than
true constitutional rights.

purposes of understanding my argument. it is crucial that readers not misread the stateaction cases to hold that there are categories of cases where entirely ··private·· conduct
that is not attributable to the government nonetheless can violate the Constitution.
27. See, e.g.. Hartman v. Moore. 547 U.S. 250. 254 n.2 (2006) ("Bivens established
that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover
damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring
such a right.") (quoting Carlson v. Green. 446 U.S. 14. 18 (1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted)): Kalina v. Fletcher. 522 U.S. 118. 123 (1997) ("Section 1983 is a codification of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The text of the statute purports to create a
damages remedy against every state official for the violation of any person's federal constitutional or statutory rights.") (footnote omitted).
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The possibility that the entitlements to sue individuals that
section 1983 creates might be narrower than true constitutional
rights is intriguing because, under current law, many infringements of constitutional rights cannot ground a damages remedy
under section 1983, notwithstanding the staiute's sweeping and
unqualified language. 2x While acknowledging that ''[s]ection 1983
creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities," the Supreme Court has "[ n ]one the less ... accorded
certain government officials either absolute 29 or qualified:1{1 immunity from suit if the tradition of immunity was so firmly
rooted in the common law and was supported by such strong
policy reasons that Congress would have specifically so provided
had it wished to abolish the doctrine. "' 1 Current doctrine thus
28. See 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 (2000).
29. The Court has recognized an absolute immunity that protects legislators acting
in a legislative capacity. Tenney v. Brandhove. 341 U.S. 367.379 (1951). judges acting in a
judicial capacity. Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547. 554-55 (1967). prosecutors acting in a
prosecutorial capacity. Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409. 417-20 (1976). grand jurors. id.
at 423 n.20. and witnesses. Briscoe v. LaHue. 460 U.S. 325. 335 (1983). The Court has
also strongly suggested. although it has never held. that some sort of affirmative .. goodfaith .. defense should be available to individuals who are not government employees but
who face liability under section 1983 pursuant to the state-action doctrine. See Richardson v. McKnight. 521 U.S. 399.413-14 (1997): Wyatt v. Cole. 504 U.S.l58.169 (1992).
30. The qualified-immunity doctrine shields individual-capacity defendants from
damages awards under section 1983 and Bivens to the extent that .. their conduct does not
violate clearly established ... rights of which a reasonable person would have known:·
Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800. SIS (1982). Harlow reformulated the qualifiedimmunity defense from one requiring both objective reasonableness and subjective good
faith into a wholly objective inquiry designed to permit claims subject to a qualifiedimmunity defense to be resolved as early in the litigation as possible. See id. at 814-18.
Since Harlow. the Court has continued to emphasize the importance of early resolution
of any qualified-immunity issues by describing the immunity as one from suit as well as
liability. Mitchell v. Forsyth. 472 U.S. 5!1. 525-27 (1985 ). which .. ordinarily should be
decided .. long before trial." Hunter v. Bryant. 502 U.S. 224. 228 (1991 ). The Court has
also treated law-based denials of pretrial motions for dismissal based on an assertion of
qualified immunity as collateral orders subject to immediate appeal under 2S U.S.C.
§ 1291 (2006). Mitchell. 472 U.S. at 524-30: see also Johnson v. Jones. 515 U.S. 304. 31112 (1995).
31. Wyatt. 504 U.S. at 163---{;4 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Initially. the Court explained its creation of the immunity doctrines in policy terms
by emphasizing a need to avoid overdeterring state actors who perform important public
functions. The Court feared that without an immunity that shields state actors from liability when thev have acted reasonablv. ··executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their ·discretion {n a way injuriously aff~ct[ing] the claims of particular individuals even
when the public interest require[s] bold and unhesitating action." Nixon v. Fitzgerald.
457 U.S. 731. 744-45 ( 19S2) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in
original).
More recentlv. as Professor Alan Chen has explained. the Supreme Court has
tended to highlighi the social costs of civil rights litigation in justifying the immunity doctrines. See Alan K. Chen. The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 23637 (2006 ). Of course. as Professor Chen recognizes, over deterrence and the costs of civil
rights litigation are closely related phenomena. See also Alan K. Chen. The Burdens of
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contemplates a two-step inquiry in any individual-capacity damages claim in which an individual defendant asserts an affirmative immunity defense: First, has the individual defendant committed a constitutional tort? Second, is the defendant
nonetheless entitled to avoid liability under the affirmative im2
munity defense asserted?'
Part II of this paper argues that the reasons the Supreme
Court has given for creating non-textual affirmative immunity
defenses better support a narrower reading of section 1983 that
would reduce the statutory analysis to a single step, render affirmative immunity defenses conceptually unnecessary, and
eliminate the anomalous subordination of statutory text to contrary common law that makes the doctrine governing constitutional tort litigation seem lawless at its most basic level." But
even if one were to reject the arguments made in Part II, recognition of the fact that an individual-capacity damages claim under section 1983 substantively differs from a true "constitutional" claim permits us to bring a new perspective to a
controversy that the Supreme Court appears ready to revisit
when it decides Pearson v. Callahan later this term: whether a
court entertaining an individual-capacity claim involving an assertion of a qualified-immunity defense should make a preliminary, law-settling determination whether there has been a consti34
tutional violation before proceeding to the immunity issue.
Under current law, the answer is yes. Prompted by concerns
about law "freezing"- that is, failing to establish what the Constitution requires and thus inviting repeated constitutional violations without accountability- the Supreme Court in Saucier directed federal courts entertaining individual-capacity damages
claims to which an affirmative qualified immunity defense is interposed to settle the law by always addressing the constitutional
issue that is imbedded within the plaintiff's claim before discussing the defendant's entitlement to immunity." The Saucier rule
has given rise to a spirited debate about the wisdom of requiring
such "unnecessary'' constitutional rulings'~> and whether the rulQualified lmmunitv: Summarv Jwlwnent and the Role of Facts in Constitwional Tort
Law. 47 AM. U. L. REV. I. 24-27 (1997).
.
32. See, e.g.. Brosseau v. Haugen. 543 U.S. 194. 197-9~ (2004).
33. See infra notes 105-114 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes ~-10 and accompanying text.
35. See Saucier v. Katz. 533 U.S. 194. 201 (2001). receded hv Pearson v. Callahan.
129 S. Ct. 80~ (2009): see also Greabe. supra note 13. at 408--11 (explaining how the qualified-immunity doctrine can cause law freezing).
36. The chief critic of the Saucier mandate on the Supreme Court has been Justice
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ings are7 barred by the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.'
In fact, however, Saucier is flawed in a more fundamental
respect. The Saucier rule is premised on an assumption that the
threshold issue raised in any section 1983 individual-capacity
claim is constitutional. But as explained above, the threshold issue in an individual-capacity claim, properly framed, is not itself
constitutional: it is whether the defendant has engaged in conduct that would constitute a section 1983 violation in the absence
of any applicable affirmative defense.-'~ True, there is a constitutional issue imbedded within this threshold statutory question.
And true, if (as current law assumes) the entitlements and duties
created by section 1983 happen to be the same as, or coextensive
with. those created by the Constitution-if. in other words, one
commits a threshold "violation" of section 1983 every time one
engages in conduct that brings about a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution-answering the threshold statutory
question positively would imply that the non-party government
entity whose power the defendant has employed has violated the
plaintiff's true constitutional rights. But the threshold statutory
ruling is not itself "constitutional," the government is not a formal party to s~ch a claim, a~d ~overnment _lawyers typically do
not defend agamst such a claim. Thus, a ruhng on the Imbedded
constitutional issue might properly be thought to lack any legal
significance whatsoever, whatever might be said about its legiti-

Breyer. See Morse v. Frederick. 127 S. Ct. 2618. 2638--43 (2007) (Breyer. J .. concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Scott v. Harris. 550 U.S. 372. 387-89 (2007)
(Breyer. J.. concurring); Brosseau. 543 U.S. at 201-D2 (Breyer. J .. concurring). But four
other Justices also have criticized Saucier. See Morse. 127 S. Ct. at 2642 (Breyer. J .. concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (summarizing other Justices· criticisms). So have other federal judges. see id. (summarizing criticisms from lower courts);
Pierre N. Leva!. Judging Under the Constitllfion: Dicta Abow Dicta. 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1249. 1275 (2006).
An article by Professor Sam Kamin contains a very nice summary of the academic
commentarv on this issue. See Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking. in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz. 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 53.55-56 & nn.l6-18 (2008).
37. Compare Thomas Healy. The Rise of Unnecessary Constillltional Rulings. 83
N.C. L. REV. 847. 920 (2005) ("Unnecessary constitutional rulings in qualified immunitv ... cases violate the ban on advisory opinions because a decision on the constitutional issue has no effect on the outcome ·of the dispute."). with Kamin. supra note 36. at
78-97 (rejecting Healy's argument other than in the rare situation in which it is apparent
from the outset of the case that no remedy will be available to the plaintiff). See also
Greabe. supra note 13. at 418-26 (rejecting the argument that a bypass of the merits of
the imbedded constitutional issue is required by Article Ill).
38. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 23.
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macy under Article IIC11 In any event, for the same reasons that
courts should not entertain constitutional challenges to statutes
without affording the government notice and an opportunity to
intervene and defend their legality.~ a court should not issue a
law-settling ruling about the constitutionality of conduct undertaken under color of state law-a ruling that could give rise to
future dam~~es l.iability that ~ill likely be passed along to the
government-- Without affordmg the government the same op•
portumty. ·
What does this mean for the law-freezing debate and Pearson v. Callahan? Certainly, it means that. in Pearson, the Supreme Court should relax the Saucier rule. which in any event
went too far in prescribing an inflexible approach to every case.~
But the Court also should remain sensitive to the concerns about
law development that led to the Saucier rule in the first place.~'
One way to strike a balance would be for the Court to emphasize
an option available to lower courts faced with individualcapacity claims to which a qualified-immunity defense is raised:
if the imbedded constitutional issue is one that should be settled
for notice-giving reasons, courts can and should invite the relevant government entity to intervene and defend the constitutionality of the challenged conduct.~" In issuing such an invitation, courts might borrow from the procedures outlined in Fed.
1

~1

40. Cf 18A CHARLES ALAl' WRIGHT. ARTHuR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER. FEDERAL PRACTICE A:--ID PROCEDCRE. § 4458. at 567 & n.20 (2d ed. 2002)
("[A] judgment against a government or one government official does not bind a different official in subsequent litigation that asserts a personal liability against the official .... "): Willner v. Budig. 848 F.2d 1032. 1034 n.2 (lOth Cir. 19RR) ("Government employees in their individual capacities are not in privity with their government
employer."): Hurt v. Pullman Inc .. 764 F.2d 1443. 1448 (11th Cir. 191\5) ("Under basic
principles of res judicata jurisprudence. for a party to be bound by or take advantage of a
prior suit that party or its privy must not only have been present in both suits. but it has
to appear in the same capacity in both suits.").
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5.1: FED. R. APP. P. 44. the requirements of which are summarized infra at note 47: see also 28 U.S.C § 2403 (2000). which authorizes intervention
by the federal government or the state into any case in which the constitutionality of a
federal or state statute is questioned but the government is not a party.
42. See supra note 23.
43. Certainly. the government's interest in such a ruling is sufficient to authorize
intervention under FED. R. Clv. P. 24. notwithstanding the fact that an individualcapacity action challenges only government conduct and not the constitutionality of a
federal or state statute. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT. ARTHCR R. MILLER & MARY
KAY KANE. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDL'RE § 1908.2 (3d ed. 2008 Supp.) (recognizing that the stare decisis effect of a judgment is frequently sufficient. by itself. to support intervention as of right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)).
44. See supra note 13.
45. For a discussion of these concerns see Greabe. supra note 13. at 426-37.
46. See supra note 43.
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R. Civ. P. 5.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 44, which must be followed in
cases where the government is not a party but the constitutionality of a federal or state statute is called into question.~ For an
adverse, law-settling ruling on the constitutional issue imbedded
within a section 1983 individual-capacity claim can impose costs
on the government that are similar in nature and scope to those
which prompted the adoption of these Rules and 28 U.S.C. §
7

2403.~x

II. THE FALSE CONFLICT THAT HAS BEEN
READ INTO SECTION 1983 INDIVIDUALCAP A CITY CLAIMS
I turn now to an argument that seeks to capitalize on the
49
possibility for doctrinal reform created if one accepts that the
substantive statutory entitlements that section 1983 creates vis-avis individuals need not be the same as, or coextensive with, the
true constitutional rights which are their referents but not their
source, and that an individual state actor therefore does not necessarily violate section 1983 every time he or she engages in conduct that causes another to suffer an infringement of a constitutional right. As previewed above, my argument is that the
Supreme Court should adopt a narrower interpretation of the
cause of action section 1983 creates against individual defendants that would (or at least could) preserve current liability

47. FED. R. C!v. P. 5.1 requires. inter alia. that a federal district court entertaining a
lawsuit to which the government is not a party but which challenges the constitutionality
of a federal or state statute notify the appropriate attorney general of the challenge and
then permit sixty days for intervention before striking down the statute. Similarly. FED.
R. APP. P. 44 requires. inter alia. that a federal appeals court entertaining an appeal to
which the government is not a party but which challenges the constitutionality of a federal or state statute send notice of the challenge to the appropriate attorney general.
48. See FED. R. C!V. P. 5.1: FED. R. APP. P. 44: see also 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2000).
which authorizes intervention by the federal government or the state into any case in
which the constitutionality of a federal or state statute is questioned but the government
is not a party.
49. One judge recently characterized "'[w]ading through the doctrine of qualified
immunity" as "'one of the most morally and conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate court judges routinely face ... Charles R. Wilson. "Location, Location, Location": Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense. 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445.
447 (2000): see also McMillian v. Johnson. 101 F.3d 1363. 1366 (11th Cir. 1996) (Propst.
1.. concurring specially) (describing keeping up with the law of qualified immunity as a
full-time job): Flatford v. City of Monroe. 17 F.3d 162. 166 (6th Cir. 1994) ("'[T]he difficulty for all judges with qualified immunity has not been articulation of the rule. but
rather the application of it."). These quotes are collected in Chen. The Facts About
Qualified Immunity, supra note 31. at 230 & n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

2008

PATH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LAW

201

boundaries'0 while doing away with the non-textual, affirmative
immunity defenses that complicate current doctrine and make
constitutional tort law seem fundamentally lawless.'! More specifically, I contend that the reasons the Supreme Court has given
for reading affirmative immunity defenses into section 1983 better support reading the statutory term ·'person"" to exclude
those defendants presently protected by absolute immunity, and
the statutory phrase "causes to be subjected"'' to require proof
that individual-capacity defendants ' 4 have acted with the same
negligence with respect to illegality" that now is required to
overcome an assertion of the qualified-immunity defense.'"
Below. I argue that such a reinterpretation of section 1983
could streamline and simplify the resolution of individualcapacity claims without affecting any substantive entitlements or
7
procedural protections that parties enjoy under current law.'
But at the outset, I wish to emphasize that my argument is not
premised on a claim that the proposed approach is compelled by
the statute's text or history. Rather, I contend only that narrowing the substantive reach of the statute is preferable to the current state of affairs as an interpretative matter because it eliminates the present regime's subordination of lawful.
democratically enacted statutory text to contrary common law.
The proposal is purely instrumental; it is prompted by a desire to
more plausibly root constitutional tort law in the positive law
text that is its source. My hope is that such reform would reduce
the number of unnecessary and costly disagreements that are
common in constitutional tort litigation, and that tend to arise
from judicial adventurism invited by the Supreme Court's many

50. Whether present liability boundaries should be redrawn is frequently debated.
see. e.g.. Barbara E. Armacost. Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused. 51 VAND. L.
REV. 583.587-88 & n.15 (1998) (providing an overview of the critica1literature). but is
beyond the scope of this paper. Here. I limit my argument to the systemic and conceptual
benefits that would flow from a clarifving reform of constitutional tort law.
51. See infra notes 86--88 and ac~o~panying text.
52. See42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
54. As non-government entities. individual-capacity defendants cannot directly
··subject"" someone to a constitutional deprivation. but can onlv indirectlv ""cause"" another to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation by misusing the gove;nment power
they wield. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
55. I follow the lead of Dean Jeffries in using the phrase ··negligence with respect to
illegality"" as shorthand for the kind of fault required to impose individual-capacity damages liability under section 1983. See Jeffries. supra note 21. at 90: see also supra note 30.
56. See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
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indications that the usual rules of statutory interpretation and
civil trial practice do not apply in this doctrinal area.
I start with an overview of current law, refracted through
the lens of section 1983's statutory language, to give readers a
sense of its mind-numbing and at times illogical complexity. The
Supreme Court has recognized that there are four types of "person" _subject to suit under section 1983: "official-capacity" persons_,, municipalities,59 individuals employed by the State or one
of its political subdivisions in their "individual capacities,"h() and
other private parties who sometimes are said to act "under color
61
of' State law. "Official-capacity" defendants may not be sued
2
for damages" because the State is not a "person" within the
63
meaning of section 1983 and a suit for damages against an official-capacity defendant is treated as a suit against the State. 64 By
contrast, "official-capacity'' defendants may be sued for injunctive relief because such suits are not treated as suits against the
State."5
Although municipalities are political subdivisions of the
State. they are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983.!\6
Unlike the States, municipalities may be sued for damages under
67
section 1983. But municipalities are not liable for damages under a theory of respondeat superior; rather, they face damages
liability only if a municipal "policy or custom" can be said to
58. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police. 491 U.S. 58. 71 & n.10 (1989) (noting
that official-capacity persons are subject to suit under section 1983 for equitable relief
even though the States are not "persons" subject to suit under section 1983 and officialcapacity claims for damages are regarded as de facto claims against the State). I prefer
the term "public-capacity defendants" to "official-capacity defendants" to account for
the fact that individuals who are not public officials can be sued in a representational capacity under the state-action doctrine. For example. there is no reason why a section 1983
plaintiff could not seek injunctive relief from the warden of a private prison in his or her
capacity as the holder of an office performing a public function. See. e.g.. Richardson v.
McKnight. 521 U.S. 399.403-13 (1997).
59. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of City of New York. 436 U.S. 658. 690
(1978).
60. Hafer v. Melo. 502 U.S. 21.25-29 (1991).
61. Richardson. 521 U.S. at 403. Private state actors may be either individual. see
id .. or corporate. see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co .. 457 U.S. 922.925 (1982).
62. Will. 491 U.S. at 71.
63. /d. at 62-71.
64. /d. at 71.
65. /d. at 71 n.lO. The Supreme Court has "explained" this anomaly by saying that
it is "commonplace in sovereign immunity doctrine:· id. (citation omitted). and that it
"'would not have been foreign to the 19th-century Congress that enacted § 1983 ... id. ( citations omitted).
66. Monell. 436 U.S. at 690 (overruling Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 167. 187-91
(1961)).
67. /d.
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have "cause[ d)" the plaintiff "to be subjected" to the deprivation
of a right secured by the Constitution (or some other federal
law).o;; Again, it is quite difficult to prove an unlawful custom or
policy, so most damages claims under section 1983 are brought
against individual defendants.m
As explained above, individuals who are employed by a
State or its subdivisions may be sued for damages.'" but such individuals are entitled to assert as an affirmative defense either a
qualified immunity 71 or, if they are fulfilling a legislative. judiciaL
or prosecutorial function, an absolute immunity.'c Private parties
who are not employed by a State or its subdivisions but who
nonetheless are accused of unlawfully exercising state power under the state-action doctrine may also be sued for damages."' but
such persons are not entitled to qualified immunity.'" They may.
however, be able to assert an affirmative "good faith" defense
that would substantially overlap with the qualified-immunity defense that state employees are entitled to assert.-' Yet a narrow
subset of individuals who exercise state power under the stateaction doctrine-witnesses and grand jurors-is entitled to assert
an absolute immunity defense that shields them from suit and liability.'"
Once again. the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
none of the affirmative immunity defenses available to individual defendants facing damages claims is expressly contemplated
by the text of section 1983, which "on its face admits of no immunities."77 But the Court has justified its recognition of these
immunities by pointing to the fact they existed at common law at

68. /d. at 694-95.
69. See supra note 23.
70. Hafer v. Melo. 502 U.S. 21.25-29 (1991).
71. See supra note 30.
72. See supra note 29.
73. See Wyatt v. Cole. 504 U.S. !SR. 163-69 ( 1992).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 16R-69. Justice Scalia has powerfully criticized the different treatment
accorded prison guards employed by the State and guards at private prisons sued under
the state-action doctrine with respect to their entitlement to qualified immunity. See
Richardson v. McKnight. 521 U.S. 399. 422 (1997) (Scalia. 1.. dissenting). My proposed
reinterpretation of section I 983 would do awav with this differential treatment bv declining to impose damages liability on any individual who does not act negligently ·with respect to illegality and therefore does not "cause" the plaintiff to suffer a constitutional
deprivation within the meaning of section I 9R3. See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying
text.
76. See supra note 29.
77. Wyall. 504 U.S. at 163 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 L'.S. 409.417 (!97fl))
(internal quotation marks omitted): see also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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the time of the enactment of section 1983's statutory predecessor, and by concluding that Congress surely would have been
explicit had it intended to override them. Moreover, the Court
has stated. these defenses are necessary to ensure fairness to
those who wield state power, to avoid overdeterring state actors
as they perform their important public functions, and to keeg in
check the high social costs generated by civil rights litigation.
Given the byzantine nature of its ground rules, it will come
as no surprise that constitutional tort law is beset with disputes
that devour judicial resources but frequently have little bearing
on the ultimate liability question that prompted the lawsuit in
the first place. A partial list of the disagreements that have divided Supreme Court justices and federal appellate judges attempting to administer the constitutional tort regime (some of
which have been discussed earlier in this paper) includes
whether courts entertaining individual-capacity actions may and
should decide the constitutional issues imbedded within individual-capacity claims under section 1983 in situations where a defendant has a meritorious qualified-immunity defense; 7y whether
"reasonableness" in the qualified-immunity context differs from
"reasonableness" in the substantive constitutional context presented in Fourth Amendment cases;"" whether and to what extent private persons not employed by the government who engage in state action are entitled to assert the qualified-immunity
defense available to government emplo~ees, a substantively different "good-faith" defense, or neither; 1 whether a heightenedpleading requirement governs section 1983 claims brought
against a defendant entitled to assert qualified immunity;"2
7R See Wyau. 504 U.S. at 163: see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
79. Compare Saucier v. Katz. 533 U.S. 194.201 (2001). receded by Pearson v. Callahan. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (majority opinion answering this question yes). with Morse v.
Frederick. 127 S. Ct. 2618. 2638-B (2007) (Breyer. L concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the question should be answered no).
80. Compare Saucier. 533 U.S. at 204 (majority opinion answering this question
yes). with id. at 209-17 (Ginsburg. L concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the question should be answered no).
81. Compare Richardson v. McKnight. 521 U.S. 399. 404-12 (1997) (majority opinion rejecting claim that private prison guards should be entitled to assert qualified immunitv). with id. at 414-23 (Scalia. L dissenting) (arguing that private prison guards should
be ·able to assert qualified immunity): Wyatt. 504 U.S. at 163-{)9 (majority opinion rejecting claim that private individuals conspiring with state officials should be entitled to assert qualified immunity). with id. at 175-80 (Rehnquist. CL dissenting) (arguing that
such individuals should be entitled to assert qualified immunity).
82. Compare Swann v. Southern Health Partners. Inc .. 388 F.3d 834. 837 (11th Cir.
2004) (indicating that the Eleventh Circuit does impose such a requirement). with Gann
v. Cline. 519 F.3d 1090. 1092 (lOth Cir. 2008) (stating that the Tenth Circuit does not impose a heightened-pleading requirement in such circumstances).
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whether denials of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. 50. or 56 motions for
judgment based on qualified immunity. to the extent that they
turn on issues of law. may be immediately appealed as "collateral orders" within meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291:'' whether the
qualified-immunity inquiry has two or three "prongs":K-1 and
whether the jury must resolve factual disputes_ bearing on an individual defendant's entitlement to immunity.''
Yet complexity alone fails to explain the nature, frequency,
and intensity of the disagreements in this area. The greater problem is that the Supreme Court has openly acknowledged its willingness to rewrite the text of section 1983 to create a regime that
"better" balances competing policy considerations than does the
actual law that Congress passed."" And so we have the Court saying that affirmative immunity defenses drawn from the common
law need to be read into the statute, even though the statute
makes no mention of any affirmative defenses and even though
statutory text usually trumps conflicting common law.'' Even if
one likes the end result as a policy matter. judicial lawlessness of
this sort comes at a cost: it suggests that the usual ground rules
do not apply to constitutional tort law. and it invites ongoing
tinkering based on nothing more than a judge's subjective sense
that a better policy balance could be achieved.""' And thus does
83. Compare Mitchell v. Forsyth. 472 U.S. 511. 52-1--30 (1985) (majority opinion
answering this question yes). with id. at 543-56 (Brennan. J .. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the question should be answered no).
84. Compare Higgins v. Penobscot County Sheriffs Dep't. 446 F.3d 11. 13-15 (1st
Cir. 2006) (majority opinion applying First Circuit"s three-pronged qualified-immunity
analysis). with id. at 15-17 (Howard. J .. concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the
First Circuit's three-prong approach to qualified immunity misapprehends the text and
arguing for a return to the two-prong approach limned in the Supreme Court"s qualifiedimmunity cases).
85. Compare Jennings v. Jones. 499 F.3d 2. 9-10 (1st Cir. 2007) (majority opinion
strongly suggesting that a factual dispute material to whether a defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity should be resolved by the jury). with id. at 22 (Lynch. J.. dissenting)
(suggesting that the trial judge might need to resolve such disputes prior to trial to honor
a qualifiedly immune defendant"s entitlement to avoid trial as well as liability) (citing
Kelley v. LaForce. 288 F.3d I. 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2002)).
86. See, e.g.. Wyall. 504 U.S. at 163 (acknowledging that the text of section 19S3
creates no immunities): id. at 165-D6 (acknowledging that Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S.
800 (1982) "reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law") (quoting Anderson v. Creighton. 483 U.S. 635.645 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)): see also 504 U.S. at 170-71 (Kennedy. J.. concurring) (acknowledging that the Harlow formulation is without textual or historical roots).
87. See, e.g.. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan. 451 U.S. 304. 317-19 ( 1981 ).
SS. Professor Chen provides an excellent account of how the Supreme Court has
encouraged the lawlessness that permeates this doctrinal area by repeatedly stating that
qualified immunity is an entitlement to avoid suit as well as liability. by repeatedlv admonishing courts to resolve qualified-immunity issues at the earliest possible stage of the
litigation. but by failing to explain lum· such early resolutions might he accomplished in
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the vicious circle continue to turn, burdening the lower federal
courts with the costly disputes that inevitably follow the objections from those who challenge the legitimacy of freewheeling
judicial lawmaking in an area that involves cherished rights and
is supposed to be governed by the text of a federal statute.
We can do better than this without altering the liability
boundaries that the current regime establishes or making it
harder for a defendant presently entitled to immunity to avoid a
trial.'" If one accepts that section 1983 is substantive insofar as it
contemplates individual liability, and that its entitlements to sue
individuals are not necessarily the same as or coextensive with
the true constitutional rights from which they are derived, one
quickly sees that the ''conflict" between statutory text and the
common law that led the Supreme Court to create section 1983's
affirmative immunity defenses is entirely avoidable. The common-law tradition of individual immunity with which the text of
section 1983 is said to conflict, and that led the Court to read affirmative immunity defenses into the statute. can be harmonized
with the text if it is invoked to explain that Congress almost certainly would not have regarded the "persons" cloaked with absolute immunity at common law to be ''persons" subject to suit under section 1983."" and almost certainly would not have wanted
individual defendants who act in an objectively reasonable manner to face damages liability for ''causing'' another to be subjected to the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution.
Indeed. as the Court has recognized, at least some of the common-law "defenses" said to underlie today's doctrines were not
affirmative defenses at all: they were elements of the claim to be
disproved by the plaintife It thus seems clear that the only reathe manv cases where a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity turns on a factual
dispute that must be resolved by a factfinder. See Chen, The Facrs Abow Qualified ImmunitL supra note 31. at 233-62. The Court's frequent admonitions without explanation
have provided the impetus for innovations in the lower federal courts such as the imposition by judicial fiat of a heightened-pleading requirement applicable to claims subject to
a qualified-immunity defense. see supra note 82. and speculations about whether the Seventh Amendment jury-trial right attaches to claims to which a qualified-immunity defense has been interposed. see supra note 85.
i\9. Again. whether altering liability boundaries is desirable is beyond the scope of
this paper. Sec mpra note 50.
90. Although section 1983 now purports to impose liability on "[e)very" person
who engages in the conduct it proscribes. the statute originally referred to "[a)ny'' person. The reviser who prepared the Revised Statutes of 1878 altered the text of the statutorv predecessor to section 1983. See Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547.563 (1967) (Douglas.
J .. dissenting).
91. For example. at common law. the plaintiff needed to establish that the defendant acted with malice and without probable cause in order to make out a viable mali-
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son for treating these ''immunities" as affirmative defenses in
conflict with the text of the statute, rather than as grounds for
considering a narrower reading of the statute, is the assumption
that section 1983 merely channels substantive rights created in
the Constitution and therefore is violated by the state's human
agent every time the state infringes the plaintiff's constitutional
rights. 92 But as argued in Part I, nothing compels this assumption.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already laid the foundation
for a narrower interpretation of section 1983. Although federal
judges routinely refer to the absolute immunities that the Court
has identified as "affirmative defenses," 93 and have stated that
they are subject to forfeiture under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) if
they are not pleaded or made the subject of a Rule 12 motion, ~ a
careful reading of the cases that first recognized these defenses
strongly suggests that those held to be absolutely immune from
section 1983 claims-legislators acting in a legislative capacity,
judges acting in a judicial capacity, prosecutors acting in a prosecutorial capacity, grand jurors and witnesses 9,-are simply not
"persons" against whom section 1983 claims can be stated. True,
the Court has not come right out and said that the term "absolute immunity" is but another way of saying that those who are
entitled to claim the immunity are not "persons" within the
meaning of the statute. But it has emphasized that a section 1983
defendant's entitlement to absolute immunity is a "question of
9

cious prosecution or abuse-of-process claim. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 176 n.l (Rehnquist.
C.J .. dissenting) (stating that it "is something of a misnomer" to describe the common
law as providing a "defense" to a malicious prosecution or abuse-of-process claim): see
also id. at 166 n.2 (majority opinion) (accepting Chief Justice Rehnquist's characterization of these torts).
92. When there were subjective elements to the qualified immunity inquiry. there
also were policy reasons for making qualified immunity an affirmative defense as to
which the individual defendant bore the burden of proof. See Gomez v. Toledo. 446 U.S.
635. 640--42 (1980) (explaining that a successful assertion of qualified immunity required
a defendant to make both objective and subjective showings and noting that the facts as
to the defendant's subjective state of mind at the time of the incident in question are "peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the defendant" and therefore appropriately
matters as to which the defendant should bear the burden of proof). But with Harlow's
transformation of qualified immunity into a wholly objective inquiry. see supra note 30.
this reason for making qualified immunity an affirmative defense has disappeared.
93. E.g.. San Filippo v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y .. 470 U.S. 1035. 1035 (19R5)
(White. J.. dissenting from denials of petitions for certiorari): Shmueli v. Citv of New
York. 424 F.3d 231.236 (2d Cir. 2005): Desi's Pizza. Inc. v. Citv of Wilkes-Barre: 321 F.3d
411. 428 (3d Cir. 2003 ).
.
94. E.g.. Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov't. 279 F.3d 273. 2R3
(5th Cir. 2002): see also Chestnut v. City of Lowell. 305 F.3d 18. 22 (lst Cir. 2002) (en
bane) (Torruella. J.. concurring).
95. See supra note 29.
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statutory construction"% that is to be resolved not by giving the
phrase "[e]very person" a "literal" reading, but rather by giving
it a reading that is sensitive to the historical context in which the
statutory predecessor to section 1983 was enacted-a context
that has been said to require a presumption that Congress would
not have intended section 1983 to reach those who were not
amenable to suit at common law. 97 By stating that the statutory
term "[ e ]very person" is not to be given a literal reading, the
Court more strongly implies that those entitled to absolute immunity are not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983
than that absolute immunity is an affirmative defense to be read
into the statute. ~
The Supreme Court also has read section 1983's "causes to
be subjected to" language to require a showing of fault. In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,w the Court
overruled Monroe v. Pape 1m and held that municipalities are
"persons" subject to a damages claim under section 1983 if they
can be said to have "caused" one to be subjected to the depriva101
tion of a constitutional right. But the Court further held that
the simple act of delegating municipal power to an official who
directly "subjects'' another to such a deprivation is insufficient to
ground a finding of municipal liability under a theory of respon102
deat superior. Rather, what is needed is blameworthy conduct
on the city's part, such as when a city adopts an unconstitutional
custom or policy and charges a city official with carrying out that
custom or policy. 103 In other words. a city does not "cause" one
to be subjected to a deprivation of a constitutional right merely
by hiring an official who, in his or her official capacity, directly
9

96. Briscoe v. LaHue. 460 U.S. 325.326 (1983).
97. /d. at 330: see also id. at 347-48 (Marshall. J .. dissenting) (framing the issue in
terms of whether the statutory term "person" includes those who assert an entitlement to
absolute immunity): Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409.417 (1976) (stating that the argument in favor of construing the term "[e]very person" to apply "as stringently as it reads"
has "not prevailed").
98. Of course. this reading of the Court's cases also would suggest that absolute
immunity is not subject to forfeiture pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) if not pleaded
or made the subject of a FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion: rather. it is grounds for an argument that the plaintiff has not stated a claim on which relief may be granted that can
be raised prior to or at trial. regardless whether it was raised in the initial response to the
complaint. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).
99. 436 u.s. 658 (1978).
100. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
101. 436 U.S. at 690-91.
102. /d. at 691.
103. /d. at 694-95: see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle. 471 U.S. 808. 816-18
(1985) (Rehnquist. J .. plurality opinion).
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"subjects" another to a constitutional deprivation. But a city
does "cause" one to be subjected to such a deprivation when it
adopts an unconstitutional custom or policy and then confers
power to carry out that custom or policy on an individual who, in
an official capacity, directly "subjects" another to a constitutional deprivation.
As just suggested, Monell is instructive not only on what is
needed to establish culpable "causation" within the meaning of
section 1983, but also on what type of statutory "person" can be
said to directly "subject" another to a constitutional deprivation,
and what type of "person" merely "causes" another to be subjected to such a deprivation. Monell makes clear that an unconstitutional municipal custom or policy does not itself "subject"
one to a constitutional deprivation; it only indirectly "causes''
one to be subjected to such a deprivation by empowering the
human agent who, in his or her official capacity, direct!~ "subjects" one to the abridgement of a constitutional right. 1 Similarly, I would submit, because an individual cannot violate any
provision of the Constitution other than the Thirteenth
Amendment, an individual acting in one's individual capacity
does not directly "subject" another person to a constitutional
deprivation. Rather, an individual acting in an individual capacity merely "causes" one to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation by using the power of the office, or otherwise by bringing
state power to bear, in a way that the Constitution prohibits.
Thus, while a person can act in both an individual and official
capacity, a person can only directly "subject" one to a constitutional deprivation in an official capacity-i.e., as a state officer
or by otherwise being an agent of the State.
To summarize: When one considers the types of "persons"
subject to section 1983 liability, the ways in which such persons
can violate the statute, and the types of remedies section 1983
authorizes, an interpretation of the statute suggests itself that respects current liability boundaries and remedy limitations, but
also recognizes the critical differences between and among the
types of "persons" who can violate section 1983, how they can
violate the statute, and the types of relief to which they are subject:
( 1) An official-capacity defendant is intrinsically governmental and therefore intrinsically capable of directly ''subject104. See Monell. 436 U.S. at 692: see also Tuule. 471 U.S. at 818 (Rehnquist. J .. plurality opinion).
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ing" another to a constitutional deprivation. Such an official
"person" is strictly liable for a direct constitutional deprivation-otherwise, a plaintiff could not invoke section 1983 to
secure forward-looking equitable relief, and plaintiffs could
not recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for litigation accomplishing reform of this sort- but is subject only to
equitable relief because the State is not a "person" subject to
a suit for damages under 1983, and a claim for damages
brought against an official-capacity person, unlike such a
claim (or equitable relief, is treated as a suit against the
100
State.
(2) An individual-capacity defendant, by contrast, is intrinsically non-governmental and therefore intrinsically incapable
of directly '·subjecting" a person to a constitutional deprivation outside of the Thirteenth Amendment; an individualcapacity defendant may only indirectly "cause" one to suffer a
constitutional deprivation by misusing power conferred under
color of state law. Unlike an official-capacity defendant, an
individual-capacity defendant who ''causes" such a constitutional deprivation is a "person" subject to the damages remedy that section 1983 explicitly contemplates. But Monell and
Tuttle make clear that section 1983 "causation" requires more
than proof of mere causation-in-fact; it requires proximate
causation in the form of proof of blameworthy conduct on the
106
part of the "person" from whom damages are sought.
(3) A municipality is a section 1983 "person" that is subject
to suit in its own name and may be ordered to pay damages,
but only if it indirectly "causes" a person to be subjected to a
constitutional deprivation through its own blameworthy conduct. Municipalities do not directly "subject" one to a constitutional deprivation; they (like States) act only through human agents who are the immediate source of any alleged
107
constitutional deprivation.

We have already seen how a municipality may incur damages liability for blameworthy conduct that indirectly "causes" a
constitutional deprivation: the promulgation of an unconstitutional custom or policy that leads a municipal official directly to
105.
106.

See supra notes 62---{)5 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
107. See Will. 491 U.S. at 71 n.lO (noting that claims for injunctive relief are to be
brought as official-capacity claims directly against the involved official): Monell. 436 U.S.
at 692 (treating the offending employee as the one who directly "subjects"' one to a constitutional deprivation); see also Tuttle. 471 U.S. at R18 (Rehnquist. J .. plurality opinion)
(similar).
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subject one to a constitutional deprivation. ' But how may an
individual-capacity defendant-whether a state employee or an
individual sued under the state-action doctrine- incur such liability? Again, because Monell holds that section 1983 "causation" requires a showing of blameworthy conduct as a prerequisite to the imposition of a damages remedy, a showing of fault is
10
and should be a prerequisite to such liability. " And what better
proxy is there for fault on the part of an individual defendant
than the objectively unreasonable, and therefore objectively
blameworthy, conduct that must be shown to overcome an asser110
tion of the qualified-immunity defense under current law?
It follows that any viable individual-capacity claim for damages should be held to require a properly supported allegation
that the individual acting under color of law "caused" the plaintiff to suffer a constitutional deprivation by means of conduct
that was objectively unreasonable because it was negligent with
respect to illegality. 111 Under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 112 this means that a wellpleaded individual-capacity claim should include sufficient allegations to "show" that the individual defendant, in an individual
capacity, not only engaged in conduct that resulted in a constitutional deprivation, but also acted in an objectively unreasonable
manner in light of the reasonably perceived facts as analyzed
against the backdrop of binding law (which the defendant is
charged with knowing). 11 ' So too at the summary judgment stage:
the plaintiff must adduce competent evidence that. if believed by
the jury, would ground a finding that the individual defendant
acted in an objectively unreasonable manner in "causinf the
plaintiff to suffer the deprivation of a constitutional right. 1 ~ Otherwise, an individual-capacity defendant should not have to face
trial and is entitled to the early dismissal, and trial avoidance,

108. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
109. See id.
110. See supra note 30.
Ill. See id.: see also supra note 55.
112. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
113. See id. at 554-556.
114. Because of the tradition of common-law immunity that the Supreme Court has
cited as one of the primary grounds for recognizing a qualified-immunity defense. section
1983 would still be regarded as a limited waiver of immunitY under such a construction of
the statute. Accordingly. denials of dispositive pretrial m~tions brought on the ground
that the defendant's conduct (as alleged by the plaintiff) was not objectively unreasonable would still be collateral orders subject to immediate appeal. per 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(2006 ). under the rule adopted in Mitchell v. Forsyth. 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (and refined in
subsequent cases). See supra note 30.
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now available under the qualified-immunity defense. But if material factual disputes preclude resolution of the case by pretrial
motion, then so be it. Section 1983 exists, and there is no reason
to deny Seventh Amendment jury-trial rights to a plaintiff who
invokes its protections and adduces credible evidence of a constitutional deprivation caused by a defendant unreasonably
wielding state power.
To be sure. this narrower construction of section 1983 is not
perfectly neat and tidy. It may seem weirdly formalistic, and contrary to modern legal conventions, to draw such fine distinctions
between and among the statutory terms "subjects" and "causes
to be subjected" and actions undertaken by persons in "official"
1
or "individual" capacities.' ' Moreover. it would take some finessing to harmonize the proposed construction of the statutory
term "subjects" in section 1983 with the same term as it is used
in 18 U.S.C. § 242, section 1983's criminal counterpart. 11 " But this
narrower reading certainly would be more faithful to the text of
section 1983 than is the present doctrinal regime, and it has the
additional virtue of being rooted in the Court's absolute immunity cases, Monell, and the plurality opinion in Tuttle. More importantly, it would do away with the non-textual affirmative defenses that unnecessarily complicate constitutional tort law, and
it would help to clarify that the limited damages liability authorized by section 1983 involves no breach of Marbury's promise of
117
a remedy for every invasion of a right. The proposed reform
could thus pave the way for the resolution of constitutional tort
law claims under ground rules that are at least somewhat more
intuitive to judges and lawyers than those established by current
law. And it might forestall the tendency of some judges to propose additional "refinements" to constitutional tort law-e.g.,

115. Of course. the liberal spirit of modern civil practice would require courts torecharacterize improperly pleaded claims and defenses to achieve substantial justice in this
complicated doctrinal area. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (2000) (amended 2007) ("All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.").
116. Under my proposed interpretation of section 1983, only an official-capacity
··person" can directly "subject" one to a constitutional deprivation: all other section 1983
"persons" (i.e .. individuals and municipalities) can only indirectly "'cause" one to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation by misusing government power or, in the case of a
municipality. giving some human agent the authority to implement an unconstitutional
custom or policy. But the criminal liability created by 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) attaches
only to those who "willfully subject[]" one to a constitutional deprivation. and not to
those who "cause" one to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation. One would have
to say. then. that section 242 proscribes only conduct willfully undertaken in an official
capacity.
117. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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heightened pleading standards 11 x or the suggestion that Seventh
Amendment jury-trial rights do not attach to claims subject to a
114
qualified immunity defense - based on nothing more than a
notion that such refinements would better serve public policy.
Lawlessness begets more lawlessness, and it is well past time to
do away with the lawlessness that permeates constitutional tort
law.
III. CONCLUSION
To succeed in law school, students must learn to regard with
skepticism their intuitive reactions to legal problems. Early in
their careers, students are ~dvised against assumi~~ that the
moral answer to a problem 1s also the legal answer, - and they
are warned that the law will depart from the dictates of logic and
history when practical considerations so require. 121 If all goes
well, students quickly internalize these lessons and learn to
check any tendency to assume that people must honor their contractual commitments or rescue a drowning child. So too do they
come to understand that legal progress is frequently achieved
through facile treatments of precedent, willful blindness to logical inconsistencies, and even out-and-out dishonesty. And thus
do law students learn to "think like lawyers."
But e':en if ·'~t]he lif~ of the law has no.t been logic: it has
been expenence," --there 1s usually room for Improvement when
legal doctrine carves completely unpredictable paths and the ordinary operational principles of law do not apply. When legal
doctrine is not intuitive or predictable to seasoned judges and
lawyers, it becomes costlier to administer. Those who must conform their conduct to the law find it difficult to anticipate the liability boundaries that courts will enforce, lawyers more frequently make mistakes, the courts are more frequently called on
to sort things out, disagreements among judges become more
common, and lawless judicial adventurism ensues.
Such is the case with constitutional tort doctrine, and at
least some of the problem lies in the fact judges have failed to

118. See supra note 82.
119. See supra note 85.
120. See, e.g.. Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Parh of rhe Law. 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897). reprinred in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991.992-97 ( 19Y7).
121. See id. c.t 998-1001: see genera/lv BE~JAMIN N. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921 ).
122. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. JR .. THE COMMON LAW I (1881).
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appreciate the substantive nature of section 1983 insofar as it authorizes causes of action against individuals for their roles in
constitutional deprivations. By recognizing the substance of section 1983, the Supreme Court could open a door to muchneeded doctrinal reform that would help to restore a sense of
predictability and lawfulness to this important area of the law.

